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Meridian, the GSC Newsletter is a peer-reviewed bi-annual publication publishing notes and short articles of up to 800words. It is published online and sent out to members of an ever-increasing community. Its focus is on Global Studies, that is, the investigation of political, economic, social, and cultural matters directly or tangentially linked to "the global." A micro-macro perspective, or global-local perspective is common though not required. Among the topics are diversity, eurocentrism, nationalisms, ecology, glocalization, communication,technology transfer, comparative topics, cultural productions at the time of globalization. Book reviews are welcome. **This Newsletter is also available online at gsc.gust.edu.kw.**

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NO 3 | SEPTEMBER 2022

Meridian

THE NEWSLETTER OF THE GLOBAL STUDIES CENTER

GULF UNIVERSITY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

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

ARTICLES

MAE AL HAJJAJ

WE STAND UP FOR WOMEN

Women's education in Kuwait started in 1937 and with it came real challenges. Culture and tradition were obstacles. The main question was why? Why do women need to go to school? Why do they need to leave the house and walk out on their families? What was to become of a society where women became independent? The fears were there but so was the potential.
It took over 60 years for Kuwaiti women to stand strong and take the lead regionally to reach high level positions beyond winning suffrage and political rights which they gained in May 2005. They grew into educated, independent and confident human beings and became an integral force to help build a nation and develop themselves and their society.

In 2015, Soroptimist Kuwait added another dimension to women's societal roles and civil society voices. Its mission is to be a global voice of women by women and for women.
Members of Soroptimist Kuwait work together to ensure that collective efforts are greater than sum of individual ones. These professional women sought to seek societal growth, justice, and equality. They are pillars of social stability and cultural development.

Soroptimist Kuwait

Soroptimist Kuwait is a local NGO with an international affiliation with Soroptimist International Europe (SIE). It was chartered by SIE on October 23, 2015 and recognized by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in August 2016. Collectively, the local and international branches are referred to as "Soroptimist Kuwait." The name Soroptimist was coined from the Latin soror meaning *sister*, and optima meaning *best*. And so, Soroptimist is interpreted as '*the best for women*'. Soroptimist International was founded in the United States in 1921 and is now composed of over 80,000 members in 132 countries and territories around the world. It retains prominent status with international organizations that are concerned with women issues. It is active in all the major UN centers around the world and holds General Consultative Status with the UN Economic and Social Council, (ECOSOC) and official relations with several agencies and a network of permanent SI representatives. It is committed to the renewed focus of the UN Global Goals for Sustainable Development (SDG's).

On a local level, Soroptimist is committed to a world where women and girls work together to achieve their individual and collective potential, realize aspirations, and have an equal voice in creating strong, and peaceful communities. Soroptimist Kuwait's mission is to inspire action towards building professional and strategic channels of leadership development and women led services. Its projects' goals aim to enable, educate, and empower women through raising awareness, advocating, and taking action. Soroptimist Kuwait has implemented over 30 projects that align with its mission. For example, we started a corporate governance project in collaboration with International Financial Corporation and the World Bank with the goal to accelerate the pace of female board appointments and increase the number of women on boards because we believe that when women are economically empowered and have control over their own finances and well-being, they have a personal sense of autonomy, self-confidence, and the power to control their private and public lives. We also aligned with the international Lean In program which helps foster leadership, advancement, and inclusion for women in the workplace.

In addition, we also worked on a variety of women's health empowerment projects. In 2020, and in collaboration with other civil societies, Soroptimist Kuwait succeeded in passing a law allowing women to sign off on medical procedures for themselves and their family members, as this was formerly restricted to male family members. This project was initiated through the United Nation's Orange the World campaign, which focuses on ending discrimination against women. Our health-related projects included a social prescription plan, titled ANA. This project empowers women by connecting them to community support to improve their health and mental well-being. We also worked on a national campaign to raise awareness of thalassemia, a blood disorder commonly found in Kuwait and the region. It involved a blood drive, the distribution of pumps to thalassemia patients, visits to children in hospitals and a youth awareness program. This project gained international exposure from Soroptimist International Europe, when we were given Best Practices Award in 2020.

Our greatest accomplishment, however, has been our projects to eliminate violence against women and girls. This included aiding victims of violence, providing counseling services, lobbying for improved prevention programs and policies, and raising awareness of this problem. We introduced the first rehabilitation program in Kuwait for survivors of domestic violence which entailed mental, social, medical, and nutritional programs. Our Orange Kuwait program in 2022, titled "I Stand With Her', which focused on men supporting women in their endeavors, gained us our second Best Practices Award from Soroptimist International Europe.

Soroptimist Kuwait also works to enable women and children to pursue lifelong learning as a means to eradicate and prevent violence against women. We have implemented many projects which further education or provide vocational training to women and girls. We also believe women play critical roles in relation to their natural environment and so we channel our experiences in developing policies and taking action towards a more sustainable environment for us and generations to come.

Soroptimist Kuwait's motto is to stand up for women and our projects reflect that mission through our advocacy, our programs, and our dedication.

Mae Hajjaj is a graduate of the University of Southern California. She is an Education Consultant and an experienced Researcher and Information Literacy Specialist and the president of Soroptimist Kuwait.

CATARINA BELO

TRANSLATING AL-GHAZALI INTO PORTUGUESE

The study of classical or medieval Islamic philosophy has been steadily growing in recent years as evidenced by many studies on a variety of medieval Islamic philosophers. Recently different translations into several European languages have also been produced, with translations into English receiving particular attention given the widespread use of English as a universal lingua franca. One might assume that, owing to the fact that specialists typically read and carry out their research into their special subject in the original languages, a translation into a modern language may not be so important in terms of fostering further scholarship into such specialized subjects. However, a modern translation makes a medieval text more widely accessible and allows for these classical texts to be assigned as textbooks in class, thus generating discussions which are likely to translate into further scholarship. In his most recent book on medieval Islamic philosophy, Frank Griffel mentions how Marmura's translation of al-Ghazālī's *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (a title which Griffel translates as *The Precipitance of the Philosophers*) has created a noted increase in studies on this work (Griffel 2021, 417). Translation of these texts into other European languages, such as Portuguese, is also important for scholars and those interested in reading medieval Islamic philosophy. In the case of Portuguese, this kind of translation will benefit scholars and students in Brazil, Portugal, and other countries where Portuguese is the official language, such as Angola and Mozambique.

With regard to al-Ghazālī, a recent Portuguese translation of Discussion Seventeen of the *Incoherence of the Incoherence* has been published by Tadeu Verza, with introduction and notes. This greatly contributes to the development of Arabic and Islamic Studies scholarship in Portuguese-speaking countries. It also assists me in my current task of translating the entirety of this work, the *Incoherence of the Incoherence*, into Portuguese, due to be published by the Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon, Portugal.

Among the issues the translator has to face is the choice of the most appropriate edition. The one published by Bouyges (Beirut, 1927) remains a favorite, as well as the more recent one published, together with an English translation, by Marmura (Provo, Utah, 2000). The choices made by the editors are important. Medieval Arabic manuscripts do not contain punctuation or a clear separation of paragraphs, and modern editions, which will serve as the basis for translations into modern languages, must introduce these elements in order to make the translated text clearer.

Other difficult issues in this particular text by al-Ghazālī concern the style he uses, addressing the philosophers sometimes in the second person, as in a dialogue, and sometimes in the third person; that is to say, he uses both direct and indirect speech in referring to the philosophers and their theories. In translating his long sentences, one has to choose whether and how to break down those sentences.

Specific differences between the Arabic and the Portuguese languages concern the sentence structure. In addition, where Arabic has a frequent use of the verbal noun (*maṣdar*) Portuguese tends to prefer an inflected verb. These are some of the examples of the differences between the two languages which the translator has to keep in mind. A literal translation of a medieval Arabic text into Portuguese would be incomprehensible to the modern reader.

Therefore, the translator has to decide whether to employ a more literal or a freer translation in order to accommodate the needs of the readers in the target language, after deciding whether the target audience is the general public or more academic. Within the process of translating, the translator has to make many choices, some of them difficult, but the usefulness of this kind of work certainly makes it a very rewarding activity when the outcome is published.

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OLIVIER HANNE

THE FIRST LATIN TRANSLATION OF THE QUR'AN: ROBERT OF KETTON, 1143

Between the 12th and 17th centuries, Europeans sought to understand Islam by translating the Quran into Latin, a translation they call *Alcoran*. From Robert de Ketton's Alcoran produced in 1143 to that of Ludovico Marracci published in 1698, nearly a dozen Latin translations of the Arabic Koran have been produced in the West. Robert of Ketton's translation cannot be deemed to be without interest, nor judged solely on its polemical intention. His work uses a number of approaches: periphrasis, compensation, addition, loan translation, adaptation, and borrowings from the *tafsir*. Robert adheres closely to the source text, for he reduces the number of words by only 5% (verification conducted on the *al-Baqarah*, the second surah), which is more or less the normal relation from Arabic to Latin, French or English.

No passage from the Alcoran is in and of itself perfectly successfull or without value, especially considering the difficulty of the text being translated. Verses 2 and 42–43 provide a good example of this "middle road" that Robert of Ketton arrived at:

Latin Alcoran (2.42): May your intent of mind be firm, never combine what is false and what is true, do not silence the truth you know, (43) right yourself through prayers, in total submis- sion of mind and body. Also give alms and fulfill your duties toward God.

Arabic Qur'an: (42) Do not cloak the truth (*haqq*) with what is futile (*batil*), do not hide the truth, you who know it. (43) Raise your prayers, give alms, bow with those who bow.

While the first half of verse 42 does not correspond to anything in the Arabic text, the second half is a fairly accurate literal translation, although the concept of truth differs in Islam (*haqq*) and Christianity (*veritas*). While the verb *interserere* ("intermix, to plant amid") is of course not the equivalent of *labisa* ("cover, clothe, hide"), the idea expressed is nevertheless quite similar. Verse 43 includes acceptable transpositions, notably between *zakat* – purifying legal alms – and *decime* ("tithe"), which are also on the order of a religious obligation. However, Robert of Ketton amplifies the requirement of submission expressed in Muslim prostration (verb *raka'a*, "to bow, to humble oneself").

Another revealing example of the methods used by the translator is Surah 101, called the « Striking Hour » :

Azoara centesima X
In n(omine) d(omini) p(ii) et m(isericordis). <4> Die mandati grauis exibunt homines uelud culices, nunc hac nunc illac promouentes, <5> fientque montes ut lana decerpta, <6> et cuicunque pondus immensum preponderabit, <7> uitam uiuet optimam, <8> cui uero leue contigerit, <11> in ignis feruidi <9> precipitium corruet.

Robert hews closely to the surah's primary meaning and eliminates all of the repetitive scansions in verses 1, 3, 10 and 11, adopting the rules of Latin rhetoric, which avoids repetition, instead of taking a more literal approach.

There is also a doubtful equivalence in verse 4 between *al-qariya yum yakun* and *mandatum grave*, and an overly rapid summary of verses 9–11 through *precipitium corruet*. On the other hand, the general meaning is preserved, even though the text is not clarified by the translation, especially for verses 6–9, which are translated literally. Robert generally remains faithful to the text's meaning and primary interpretations, introduces nuances, and looks for the equivalent phrase, but does not capture the book's scansions, rhythm, narrative style, and numerous images. Certain translations are nevertheless particularly successful, with respect to both words and content. He mostly follows the framework for the verses, but not their number or the structure of the surats. Robert of Ketton had to contend with many pitfalls. The Qur'an has of course been translated, but is considerably diminished, with the Latin leading to other meanings and new undertones, but rarely to

basic errors. Transfers from the Arabic that are perfectly adapted in Latin are rare. The translator cuts, shifts, amplifies verses, and creates logical connec- tions to reconstitute a text based on Latin rhetoric, thereby betraying the text he wants to transmit. He doesn't always understand the nature of the Qur'an, its modes of thought and inconsistencies. With respect to his methods, it is impor- tant to note how much they evolve from one passage to another.

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LEAD ARTICLE

MOHAMMAD ALWAHAIB

One State or Two? An Exploration of Hannah Arendt's Solution to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

This article explores the horizons of two classical solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, namely, the one-state and the two-state solution. Instead of focusing on the historical circumstances and events that lead to the emergence of these two solutions, I will try to focus on the advantages and disadvantages of both. The second part of this article is devoted to Hannah Arendt's proposal to end the conflict, which is to be found in her early writings on the so-called Jewish question. This article will explore Arendt's proposal in light of the present reality of the conflict.

Two broad solutions, interspersed with many details, are at the forefront of thinking today regarding a solution to the Palestinian question, despite the fact that one is more well-known than the other. The first solution, and probably the most famous one, is the two-state solution; the other is the one-state solution. The two-state solution implies the creation of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, given that each of the parties involved in this issue already wants to lead and govern their own state in a different way: the Israelis want a Jewish state while the Palestinians want a Palestinian state. Given the contradiction of these visions, the rational solution would be providing each of them an independent state. This solution has its roots in the United Nations resolution of 1947.

The "one-state" solution views the end of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the creation of a federal or Confederate state encompassing Israel's geographical territory, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem. This solution necessarily involves Israelis losing their dream of a national state to Jews and Palestinians losing their dream of independence and national statehood.

The fact is that with the ongoing stubborn policies of the Israeli government and its refusal to demarcate its boundaries, talk of any form of peace seems impossible. While almost every reflection on the Palestinian question brings us back to these solutions, the real problem is that the reality of today forces us to realize how impractical they are. That these two solutions became alienated from reality, is probably predicted by Hannah Arendt in the 1940s. The prediction was proven to be true to a large extent: the partition of Palestine caused the destruction of the Arab-Palestinian entity, and the de-facto Israeli annexation of the West Bank has hindered and paralyzed the Palestinian Authority from acting as an independent sovereign state.

Today's reality is more complex than that experienced by Arendt. Israel never stopped seizing the territory of Palestine, and every time it does so, we find it disturbing that the world affirms Israel's right to exist, while consciously and thoughtfully denying the Palestinians this right. The two traditional solutions have been reduced to one: one state, Israel, built entirely on the ruins of a destroyed Palestine. That has been the case in all its hideousness since 1948 until today, and if the situation continues at the current pace, Palestine will be erased from existence, and the Palestinians will become 'homeless' people, trapped in a geographical area with no identity – stateless, if you will, in a state that exercises its tyranny by rejecting their right to exist. This was actually announced by former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert H. Serry in 2012: after criticizing the construction of continuous settlements, Siri said, "we could be moving down the path toward a one -state reality." [1]

A quick survey of the literature on the subject of the two-state solution reveals that when it is usually rejected, it is actually rejected for the following reasons:

1. The Zionists and most Israelis today have no doubt that what they really want is all of Palestine. All those flimsy arguments, which disrupt the negotiations and turn it into a "process", are only procrastinating to buy time without concrete action. The failure of the "peace process" is an obvious sign of that intention.

2. A two-state solution is a destructive solution for geography and human togetherness since it separates people and turns this small region into Swiss cheese.

3. The Palestinians will never give up the right to return for nearly one million refugees from diaspora, and Israel will not agree. The Israelis will never accept to be outnumbered by the Palestinians.

4. Muslims, Christians, Jews, or even seculars who are interested in any representation in any government will not give up on the idea of ruling over Jerusalem either partially or fully. Jerusalem will always be a central problem for all parties.

6. More than 400,000 Jewish settlers reside illegally in the occupied territories and refuse to leave their settlements at all costs. This could be one of the most important factors that would hinder the two-state solution.

7. Israel today looks like a military barracks with its military wing refusing to allow any form of sovereignty to the Palestinians as a neighboring country: the new emerging Palestine, if there is any, will not be allowed to have an airfield, or a special airport; it will not be able to create any military force that could pose a threat to Israel, have no water rights and no access to the sea at all costs.

8. Any order, any suggestion, to remove any settlement, whether it is legal or illegal, is met with great concern, anxiety, and probably distrust by Jews since it reminds them of the diaspora and the Holocaust. This also applies to all Jews all over the world.

9. The daily life situation in the Palestinian territories is very poor, harsh and very difficult—a situation that will probably lead to one intifada after another and further violence. These poor living conditions will always be understood from the Palestinian point of view as a result of the Israeli occupation. The two-state solution, then, is probably a fragile project, given the constant Palestinian threat.

Why Hannah Arendt's proposal?

The frightening reality of a Palestinian state through a two-state solution might prompt us to think a little "outside the box"; and despite the difficulties facing the one-bi-national state project, I believe, it deserves some reconsideration. Today we are faced with a complex international reality, the signs of which are many:

1. The international community of today is unable to recognize or do anything about the destruction of Palestine, although the scene of the international order has begun to show some signs of change.

2. This conflict is a unique one: as the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis intensifies, both parties are aware implicitly that it is impossible for one of them to annihilate the other. Both parties *know* that eventually they must come up with an agreement.

3. The escalation in the last few years has led the majority of all parties to view violence as the only means, and unfortunately, the legitimate means of resolving the dispute. Violence, as we witnessed a few weeks ago, is something that might eventually lead to the destruction of all parties.

A few days ago, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas delivered the coup de grace to the moribund so-called peace process which began almost 30 years ago. This is an official de facto collapse of the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. At times like this, we will probably find an echo for Hannah Arendt's call for a new discourse and a new solution, or in her own words: a new beginning. After 30 years of fruitless peace negotiations, many scholars have turned their attention to her early writings in the 1940s, and more specifically to her criticism of Zionism and its push towards the creation of a Jewish state.

Hannah Arendt, for those who are unfamiliar with her biography, has traveled intellectually between many 'islands' of thought. She began her life with pure philosophical concerns, this is not surprising when we look at her academic background: in fact, she inherited the tradition of German philosophy through her education in German universities. She was a distinguished student and lover of Martin Heidegger in Marburg, and later in Heidelberg a pupil and a lifetime friend of Karl Jaspers. It is under the supervision of Jaspers that she wrote her first doctoral dissertation, *the Concept of Love in St. Augustine*. For most of the time she spent in universities, Arendt did not show any interest in political matters. However, when the Nazis rose to power in Germany, Arendt tells us, it was the occasion that made it possible for her to face the fact of her 'Jewishness'—the vehicle that escorted her into politics. The hostility of the Nazis towards Jews, as well as other minorities, turned Arendt's attention towards politics and 'action'. Later, she was intensely engaged in Jewish politics and Zionism as an active passionate member. In the middle of all these events, Arendt declared her divorce from all forms of traditional philosophizing: "I left Germany [escaping from the Nazis] dominated by the idea... Never again! I shall never again get involved in any kind of intellectual business. I want nothing to do with that lot. [2]" This period of time that she spent involved in Jewish politics is marked by a number of articles on the so-called Jewish question and parts of her famous work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, and in these articles, we find an explicit, harsh [word missing] of the Zionist ideology.

These early writings on the Jewish question and Zionism, which began in 1937 and lasted for almost a decade, are the focus of this article. Arendt's critique of Zionist ideology took three directions:

first, the Zionist vision of the meaning or essence of the term, "Jewish people". Second, her analysis of the actual presence of Arabs in the territory of Palestine, and third, the absence of a Jewish policy independent of the world's great powers. I will try to look in some detail at the first and second critiques as they pertain more to our subject matter.

With regard to the Zionist vision of the meaning and the future of the Jewish people, Arendt criticized the Zionist concept of the nation-state and viewed it as a terrible and outdated form of a state. In fact, she labelled those who embraced this idea “the new fascists”, referring to those who commit themselves to the creation of a Jewish/ethnic national state. Against this national vision, Arendt proposed the establishment of an Arab-Jewish Confederation in Palestine, based on recognition of the plurality of individuals, and the guarantee of their equal rights.

Thinking of a "Jewish state" from a Zionist perspective was, for Arendt, a wrong reaction to anti-Semitism in Europe, since such a Jewish state will exercise the same hostility that Jewish people suffered but against the Arabs this time. Arendt recognized that such a state can only be established through force, and rightly so, since no people can accept the stealing of their land, or become stateless overnight, or at best, second-class citizens. Imposing a Jewish nation-state in that way would only lead to continued violence. Arendt predicted that even if the Jews won the war, they would:

"degenerate into one of those small warrior tribes about whose possibilities and importance history has amply informed us since the days of Sparta... Thus, it becomes plain that at this moment and under present circumstances a Jewish state can only be erected at the price of the Jewish homeland." [3]

You don't need to do much to persuade yourself of the reality of Arendt's predictions; all you need to do is walk down any street of Israel and see for yourself the heavily armed soldiers everywhere.

Arendt stood firm in the face of Zionist claims calling for the establishment of a Jewish state on the territory of Palestine, and because of the denial of the rights of those indigenous people she called for a bi-national state. The idea of a bi-national state is not new, of course, as it was preceded by some Jewish intellectuals such as Judha Leon Magnes, Gershom Scholem, Martin Buber and others, in addition to some associations such as Bret Shalom. This idea, bi-nationalism, meant for Arendt that the state should be separated from religion and national identity.

Youssef Munayyer wrote in the New Yorker, influenced by that Arendtian line of thought and in favor of a one-state solution:

"The reality now is that there is a single state. The problem is that it takes an apartheid form. Billions upon billions of dollars continue to be poured into the Israeli settlement enterprise. Natural resources are being exploited illegally. More and more land is being taken from Palestinians. Israeli infrastructure plans are growing. Everything about the Israeli state’s actual behavior suggests it has no intention of ever leaving the West Bank." [4]

Since the two-state solution is obsolete, Munayyer suggests that we should come to a practical, pragmatic recognition that we have in fact is a “one-state problem”, and that this recognition is “the key to peace”—all we need in this case is a regime change. Following the Arendtian spirit, he asserts that the first step in this change is ending legal discrimination based on ethnicity or religion throughout the entirety of the territory. Palestinians must be part and parcel of shaping any future state they will live in, and they can do so only on equal footing with their Jewish counterparts before the law, not under military occupation.

There is a problem concerning the difficulty of imagining this one bi-national state solution. The main reason behind this is the fact that the recent Palestinian and Israeli rhetoric has reached such a level of contradiction that it became so hard to speak of reconciliation or compromise. This is probably a logical conclusion to the Zionist premises: the Zionists were blinded to other partners on the same land and never considered them to be equal to them. Arendt explained this through historical events: the first Zionist program in 1942, issued in Biltmore, called for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, and the Atlantic City program that followed, referred to a free Jewish Commonwealth covering the entire territory of Palestine without division. In the first program, minority rights were given to the Arab majority; in the second program, Arabs were never mentioned at all! This disregard for the Palestinians, she believed, is due to the increasing ideological tone of Zionism which goes hand in hand with its detachment from commonsense and reality.

But the problem seems to be deeper than just Palestinian and Zionist claims; the problem is one of land in which each of the parties to the conflict claims its right to it. We know well that one of the parties had lost the war, but the conflict did not end until today. The truth is that, after nearly seventy years of conflict, this land or the independent state of Jews has not been fully independent, and it still finds itself day after day trapped in the net of non-Jews. The problem of land is linked to a more complex problem of identity: Palestinians want to retain their Arab identity at all costs, given the Arab-Muslim region as part of which they want to see

themselves, and Jews who want a Jewish state as envisioned in the Zionist ideology.

The central question for Arendt, I believe, as an alternative to the two-state solution, is the need to think along the lines of a bi-national state, to think of the possibility of peaceful coexistence between Jews and Arabs in a partnership that is based on equal rights. I believe that she really wanted to present a challenging alternative to us, an alternative that is based on the impossibility of getting rid of the other, one that looks at democratic institution-building, transitional justice and a new constitution. The fact of not being able to get rid of the other is, by the way, becoming an increasing conviction among Palestinians and Israelis day after day.

Expert on Jewish History at the University of Ben-Gurion, Amnon Raz Krakotzkin, may rightly believe that this Arendtian vision is one "with a temporal specificity that does not make sense outside the framework of that history." In his view, the one-state solution of Arendt is "a dreamy idea that does not reflect reality... Not more than a cultural contribution." [5] However, I believe that Krakotzkin's conclusions are a bit hasty, in fact there seems to be a lot of factors to be considered before coming up with such conclusions. First, there are many Israeli and Arab intellectuals and activists today who resent the strong influence of some Orthodox, radical parties in Israeli and Arab politics, and this belief has pushed them to gather around the idea of a truly secular Israeli society in which citizenship rights are given to all.

Second, there are many Jewish Israelis who speak and write about the importance of entering the phase of "post-Zionism"; after nearly 70 years of Israeli history, traditional Zionism has provided neither a solution to Palestinians nor an independent Israeli existence.

Echoing the Arendtian spirit, Edward Said writes:

"I see no other way than to begin now to speak about sharing the land that has thrust us together, sharing it in a truly democratic way, with equal rights for each citizen. There can be no reconciliation unless both peoples, two communities of suffering, resolve that their existence is a secular fact, and that it has to be dealt with as such." [6]

The alternatives are unpleasantly simple: either the war continues or a way out, based on peace and equality, as in South Africa after apartheid, is actively sought, despite the many obstacles. Once we grant that Palestinians and Israelis are there to stay, then the decent conclusion has to be the need for peaceful coexistence and genuine reconciliation.

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Notes

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GERT HUSKENS

BELGIAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CREATION OF MIXED COURTS IN EGYPT

> "The cornerstone of the Reform is the European judge – the judge from abroad, who brings with him the traditions which are the rightful birthright of a magistracy." [1]

At the end of the 1860s the wind of change that propelled Egypt's modernization reached the country's judicial system. An amalgam of evolutions had paved the way for a reinterpretation of the Egyptian judicial system and a new system was convened upon between the Egyptian government and the Western powers that become increasingly present in the country. This new system were the Mixed Courts. A lot of the success of the Mixed Courts depended – as the above-mentioned quote by prime minister Nubar Pasha shows – on the judges that would sit on the bench. Notwithstanding their importance to the new institution, the way they were selected and introduced to Egypt has however not been given the attention it deserves.

The idea had not received a warm welcome by the Belgian diplomatic corps in Egypt. Prejudices, distrust and hesitation fueled the stance of Belgian consuls-general Étienne Zizinia and most importantly Charles Hector de Noidans Calf. On the other hand however, the Belgian government did

not want to merely watch one of the country's backbones being reformed by the major powers without having at the least being allowed to assist the negotiations. Via these meetings, several of the delegates attending it trickled into the new judiciary, including future governor-general of the Congo Free State Camille Janssen. A second route towards Egypt was opened by the Belgian government itself, who was officially in charge of providing their Egyptian counterparts with magistrates, by launching a public call. Even though most of these applications ended up in the paper bin, three perfect candidates were found. Next to Camille Janssen, Belgium sent Adolphe Devos, King's prosecutor in Bruges and Guillaume De Brouwer, substitute of the King's prosecutor in Brussels. Especially de Brouwer, who would climb the ranks of the Mixed Courts and was attorney general in Alexandria from 1889 until his death in 1892 left an impression Belgium could profit already quite early from the opportunities this new transnational organization provided. As then prime minister of Belgium Walthère Frère-Orban realized, the country really punched above its international weight in the early days of the Mixed Courts. With no less than three judges, who were appointed at the Mixed Court's most prestigious positions, Belgium translated its intellectual importance in the emerging field of international law into a tangible result. As history would later prove, this early involvement in the creation of the Mixed Courts would later result in a sustainable and lasting impact on Egypt's legal history. In the interwar period, Belgian judges were among the country's most prominent legal experts, and in 1923, Firmin Van den Bosch, Belgian attorney general at the Court of Appeal of Alexandria, even helped to draft the constitution of Egypt. As Huskens demonstrated, the seeds of this lasting impact on the judicial fundaments of a country as small as Belgium on Egypt, were sawn more than a half century earlier.

Note

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YUNUS ABAKAY

IMPERIALIST GLOBALISM: FROM EXPLOITING MINES TO EXPLOITING MINDS

Migration is one of the most discussed topics in economically developed Western countries and is a crucial element on the agenda of right-wing politics. Building walls, wires, and fences to prevent people from crossing their borders and taking legal action, such as the UK's agreement with Rwanda to relocate migrants reaching its shores, continue to dominate political debates. However, remarkably, these countries also pass laws to attract a skilled labour force, such as engineers and healthcare workers, adding to the migration phenomenon. The criticisms of policies against migration and those calling for more restrictions have mainly remained local, focusing on the cultural aspect. Nevertheless, reading these two policies together shows that a regional focus misses the economic structure at a global level.

Wallerstein (1974) proposed the 'world economic system' theory to show how multicultural territories are integrated by economic relations. He divided the world into the *core* and the *peripheries*, with technologically developed, capital-intensive countries constituting the core; and labour-intensive, less developed countries constituting the peripheries. In this system, *semi-peripheral* or developing countries, constitute a buffer zone between the core and the periphery. The system functions by the accumulation of the surplus capital in the core that generates the dependency of the periphery. The 'world economic system' is based on the worldwide division of labour; labour intensified works are allocated to the periphery, and high-technology works are at the core. There is also the flow of raw materials to the core to be sold on the periphery markets as refined products. As a result, the core reproduces the conditions of dominance to continue exploiting the periphery.

The ageing population and low birth rate in the core, together with the cost of long-term investment in human capital, made attracting skilled labour in the periphery a solution. The impact of the pandemic on the economy and the World Bank's suggestion to invest in human capital for a resilient recovery (World Bank 2021) intensified this search that brought more attention to this phenomenon. Germany's making legal amendments to attract skilled workers from other countries, and the UK's aim to retain higher education graduates from UK universities to fuel their economies after the pandemic are two cases in point. What made this phenomenon more popular, however, is not only the recent development, but the fact that the skilled labour flight has accelerated since the 1960s, with the developed countries constituting the most popular destinations (Docquier 2014). Although the statistics (Global Economy 2022) show that the developed countries, such as Germany and the UK, are also not exempt from experiencing the skilled workers' flight, the trend follows economic development in which less developed countries are those affected most.

Wallerstein's reading of the capitalist world order shows a parallel with the Marxian class structure in which the bourgeoisie exploits the proletariat and the petit bourgeoisie, who is also a buffer zone between the two. The difference in Wallerstein's reading, however, is designation of surplus capital in a country, rather than a class, such as global bourgeoisie. This also draws parallels with the colonial exploitation of the colonised countries and the imperialist intrusions aimed at controlling natural resources, such as oil, gas and minerals. The brain drainage from periphery countries to more developed countries needs to be seen as the continuation of exploitation in the global age in which high-tech products generate the most surplus capital, and in which sophisticated skilled workers constitute resources of investment.

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HAMDULLAH BAYCAR

GLOBAL-LOCAL: BEING AN EMIRATI IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

With globalization, the influence of national and local identity was expected to loosen at the expense of global and cosmopolitan identities. However, despite the increased foreign population in nation-states, the citizens still have a considerable attachment to their national identity. The recent rise of right-wing politics in the United States (US) and Europe is believed to have a direct relation to globalization (Rodrik, 2021).

The rise of right-wing politics in the US and Europe occurred despite the number of foreigners being limited in the country's total population. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country where the number of nationals is only ten percent of the country, presents an interesting case to examine how the number of non-nationals plays a role in the debate around national identity and globalization in general.

The UAE deserves to be ranked amongst the world's most multicultural countries, from the number of languages spoken there to the visibility of world architecture. The UAE has a complex relationship with globalization. While nationals do complain at times about their identity being lost, globalization is also embedded within the national identity, not only through globalizing the UAE's (and the Arabian Gulf's) heritage but also by using globalization-related concepts within the national identity, such as tolerance and multiculturalism.

The Fallacy of Diversity Came with Globalization

Two major fallacies occur in the UAE's narrative of globalization. The first is that of the historic homogeneity of the land by, claiming that the boom of migration to the UAE occurred after the discovery of oil, which was a cause for UAE's integration into globalization and thus the reason for the UAE's diversity. However, Akinci (2018), AlMutawa (2016), Kanna (2011), Onley (2016), and Vora & Renard (2021)

have shown the homogenous status of UAE's pre-oil society to be little more than a myth, as in reality Persians, Indians, and Africans had settled in the Gulf Emirates years and sometimes centuries before the discovery oil and the establishment of the UAE itself.
The second fallacy corresponds with modern diversity. As the UAE's economy is based on a foreign workforce, the country's diversity and multicultural status are de facto requirements for its existence (Fox et al., 2006). However, diversity and multiculturalism in the UAE face "indigenous conservatism," where the "traditional social structure persists and directs the changes, and serves to filter what is acceptable" (Fox et al., 2006, p. 3). Therefore, multiculturalism and diversity in the UAE may not mean to its inhabitants what they mean in the rest of the world.

The Benefit of the Globalisation: Diversity and Tolerance

After aiming to show the heterogonous status of the state as a post-oil issue, the UAE's political elites utilized the concepts of diversity and tolerance as pillars of the state and presented diversity a result of the multiculturalism that arose after globalization. These two terms are used in many contexts. For example, the word "tolerance" is emphasized through the appointment of the first-ever Minister for Tolerance, who announced the year 2019 to be the Year of Tolerance. All of these initiatives helped the UAE build a positive image domestically and internationally.

While the UAE presents itself as a tolerant and multicultural state by using the relevant terminology repeatedly, the country also presents the existence of foreigners as a benefit in the arena of international politics. For example, the first-ever Papal visit to the Peninsula in 2019 was described as "tremendous" opportunity for Catholics to meet and welcome their leader and also an opportunity "allow[s] the world to appreciate the UAE's contribution to pluralism and safe, peaceful prosperity", a statement made by Sheikh Nahayan Bin Mabarak Al Nahyan, then UAE's Minister of Tolerance. The visit was considered a recognition of the migrants but also as a significant diplomatic achievement by the country's leaders, made possible, however, through the diverse population of residents (Debusmann, 2019).

Proud World and Emirati Citizen

The notion of the UAE as a small cosmos (200 nationalities living in harmony) and the Emiratis' ability to travel the world create a sense of appreciation among the nationals, while also lending a sense of harmony and multiculturalism to the country in the eyes of the non-nationals and the world. This double-edged globalization (the UAE as a home of 200 nationalities and a powerful passport which allows citizens to travel all over the world) creates a sense of "world citizenry" in the UAE. The notion of "world citizen" actually functions to empower and strengthen the Emirati identity through the prestige the UAE has been able to achieve. Their country's success gives the citizens pride in their national identity.

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EMILY GOSHEY

TRACING THE GLOBAL IN AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

With icons like Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali, many around the world are aware that there are African American Muslims. A growing body of scholarly work documents the rich history of conversion to Islam among Black Americans and the diverse ways in which they have practiced their faith. These studies demonstrate what is American about the African American turn to Islam, grounding the history in contexts of Black religion, Black nationalism, and the Great Migration. [1] Important as the American context is, another side of this story is more international in scope. The frequency of travel to and from the Islamic world and the influence of international Muslim thought attest to the global side of African American Islam.

Malcolm X's *Autobiography* testifies to the transformative effect of travel to the Islamic world in his own life. [2] His 1964 pilgrimage was a pivotal moment in his shift from the "proto-Islamic" Nation of Islam to traditional, Sunni practice. [3] Malcolm's voyage, however, was neither the first nor the last such example. From the early days of African American conversion to Sunni Islam in the 1930s, individual believers have traveled to the Muslim heartlands to make pilgrimage and seek knowledge. Professor Muhammed Ezaldeen, born James Lomax, became "the single most important figure in the early development of African American Sunni Islam." He had travelled to Turkey and Egypt in the 1930s before returning to New Jersey to found the Addeynu Allahe-Universal Arabic Association (est. 1938). [4] Nafi Muhaimin of Philadelphia, after converting to Islam in the 1940s, eventually received a scholarship to study at the Islamic University in Medina (est. 1961) and moved his entire family to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s. Years later, after completing their own studies in Medina, his sons, Anwar and Anas Muhaimin, continue to run Quba Masjid on Lancaster Avenue in West Philadelphia today. African American converts have been traveling to Muslim countries to study Islam and then returning to their home communities for nearly a century. This pattern has shaped the landscape of Islam for Black Americans.

Trends in Islamic thought abroad have impacted even those who have never been abroad. For instance, in Philadelphia, many who converted to Sunni Islam in the 1970s recall the popularity of books by Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, the Islamic revivalist from India. [5] Whether they borrowed copies from friends or purchased their own at Hakim's Bookstore on 52nd Street, Mawdudi's books were some of the most popular texts for new Muslims of that era. Other converts from that period remember reading *Milestones* by Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb. [6] Looking back, themes of these texts certainly matched the institutional culture of some early African American mosques. Dar-ul-Islam was the preeminent Black-led Sunni organization of the 1970s, and it required its members to pledge themselves "to the majlis (imamate), whose duty is to establish, develop, defend, and govern according to the precepts of the Shariah." [7] These American Muslims were tuned into the language of establishing Islamic sovereignty. It was a language that thinkers like Mawdudi and Qutb had promulgated for years and it found receptivity among young, Black converts who were looking to Islam as not only a new system of belief but as an alternative way of life. It also landed well on ears accustomed to the slogans of independence and self-reliance that had been familiar from the era of Marcus Garvey through the rise of the Black Panther Party.

Subsequently, we can see that African American Muslim communities have since shifted away from the militant and politically-oriented interpretations of Islam as have many in the Middle East. In the wake of a stream of conflicts and violence associated with Islamist movements in the 21st century, Qutb and Mawdudi have largely disappeared from, for instance, both institutions of learning in Saudi Arabia and the African American Muslim community in Philadelphia. While those who converted in the 1970s were quick to pick these authors up, the current generation of converts would be unlikely to read their works. The Da'wah Center on Germantown Avenue, one of the largest Islamic bookstores serving Philadelphia's African American Muslim community today, would not even carry Qutb.

African American Muslim communities interact not only with the Qur'an and Sunna, but also with ideas, people and trends from the Islamic heartlands. We are just beginning to understand the global dimensions of this vibrant Muslim community that is indigenous to the West yet engaged with the East. As we learn more, we will also be able to collect evidence for a closely related question: In what ways have African American Muslims influenced the global umma?

Notes

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[2] X, Malcolm and Alex Haley. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. Grove Press, 1965.

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[4] Bowen, Patrick D. *A History of Conversion to Islam in the United States, Volume 2: The African American Islamic Renaissance, 1920-1975*. (Brill, 2017: 386-394).

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GUNDA KINZL

THE ARABIC DIALECT(S) OF THE RAŠĀYDA

Tribal groups that go by the name of Rašāyda, or the synonymous Bani Rasheed live in various locations in the Arabic speaking world, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt and the Palestinian territories. Several of them, despite the great geographical distance between them, claim common ancestry. These groups are increasingly in contact with each other via social media, internet forums, and associations that also organize mutual visits. They were leading a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle dependent on camel herding, sometimes in addition to fishing, before gradually becoming settled with the formation of nation states and the oil boom. It stands to reason that indeed there once was a tribe or tribal confederation, from which at various points in history groups split and migrated to a new location (Young, 2019).

Since group membership in tribes is based on patrilineal family ties rather than bound on geographical proximity, a working hypothesis for linguists is that a tribe will share a colloquial variety among its members, that distinguishes them from others. This is especially relevant when contact with speakers of a different variety is limited. Ethnographic data indicate that the Rašāyda often maintained a distinct ethnic identity, and some linguistic data corroborate that even over large distances, tribes maintain a shared linguistic variety (Ingham, 1979; Zaborski, 2017).

To test this hypothesis, the Rašāyda present an interesting case for three reasons: firstly, they are dispersed over a large geographic area, yet at least some of their migrations, such as to Sudan, date back less than 200 years. Secondly, their marriage policies are traditionally endogamous, and first-cousin marriage used to be the norm and is not uncommon today. Even though today's marriage norms are certainly more lenient, marriage outside of the tribe is rare and usually a privilege of the upper class. That means that until recently, especially women were rarely in contact with linguistic varieties other than their own. Thirdly, whether the connection between the tribal groups in various locations is recent or ancient, the increasing contact between them may be a factor that makes their linguistic varieties converge. The connection that transcends national borders creates the social reality of belonging to a multinational tribe. While this could make certain local features disappear, it could on the other hand also make the Rašāyda's colloquial variety more resilient to change in the direction of a supra-regional or national variety that elsewhere tends to do away with more conservative forms of speech.

To the end of knowing more about how tribal identity shapes language behavior, a description of the variety or varieties the Rašāyda speak is needed. Descriptive grammars of languages and dialects still largely depend on fieldwork conducted with speakers on-site. For this purpose, scholars depend on the respective communities of speakers, and also on scholarly and bureaucratic infrastructure such as provided by the Global Studies Center at GUST to facilitate research. Members of the tribe are asked to give narrative interviews, tell folk tales or tales about the oral history of their tribe and region. Possible topics of conversation are e.g. life stories, myths, traditional attire or festivities such as weddings. In addition, linguistic data is elicited through a questionnaire and visual stimuli such as pictures that participants are asked to describe and picture stories they are asked to narrate.

New data elicited in fieldwork provides a corpus for analysis, which takes into account socio-historic and sociolinguistic factors as agents of linguistic convergence and divergence. A comparative approach is facilitated by collecting data in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and comparing them with data from Sudan. The research is embedded in a database as part of the WIBARAB (**W**hat **I**s **B**edouin **A**rabic?) project funded by the European Research Council (ERC) hosted at the University of Vienna in collaboration with the Austrian Academy of Science.

This new data of course has to consider the multi-layered realities of today. Even where restrictive marriage policies persist, university and social media facilitates contact between speakers of different varieties. It is thus consistent that data reveal clear generational gaps between speakers. Another very

important aspect is the difference between the speech of women and men, an aspect which has so far not been discussed widely. The description of varieties spoken by the Rašāyda contributes to Arabic dialectology while also enabling further typological and sociolinguistic considerations, especially regarding varieties that are considered "bedouin" as opposed to "sedentary" varieties of Arabic. It thereby serves to present and preserve the plurality of spoken Arabic.

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BEN BENNETT CARPENTER

THE GLOBAL AS TROPE-ICAL

When most of us think "global", we think "something real." That is, we may take for granted that the global is real. To think otherwise is unthinkable (or absurd), we think: the global is not real? Of course it's real. But beyond simple real-irreal bifurcation, there is a third way. This third way could go by many names: virtual, simulated, iconographic, maybe metaphoric. For the moment, I'm going to call it "trope-ical."

Years ago the literary and cultural theorist Kenneth Burke (1945/1969) outlined what he called the "Four Master Tropes" (p. 503). If we put these four tropes up as lenses in front of what we call the "global" we get some interesting perspectives that aren't so monochrome as simple reality. In a bit of rapid-fire here, let's take four quick snapshots:

1. Global as metaphor. "Metaphor is a device for seeing something in terms of something else" (Burke, 1945/1969, p. 503). So if we think of global, then we ask ourselves, What is the something else for which it stands? We can flip this around and ask, What are terms we use to stand for it? For example, "global village" – we know the global is not really a village, but by saying so it gets us thinking in certain directions heuristically, for instance how certain social roles and relationships make villages (and global relations) work (or not work). The word "global" is a way to see things that wouldn't necessarily go together, plus seeing things that are NOT global as global, e.g., "local."

2. Gobal as metonymy. "The basic 'strategy' in metonymy is this: to convey some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible. E.g. to speak of 'the heart' rather than 'the emotions'" (p. 506). Thus we speak of "the globe" rather than what? One of my cousins is a dairy farmer in Pennsylvania in the USA, and he tells me that the price of a gallon of milk has gone down by two pennies (i.e. two cents: $0.02 USD) or, on another day, up by two. The jug of milk is the global in hand, so to speak trope-ologically.

3. Global as synecdoche. Burke "consider[s] synecdoche in the usual range of dictionary sense, with such meanings as: part for the whole, whole for the part, container for the contained, sign for the signified...etc." (pp. 507-508). What's amazing about synecdoche in this sense is its reversibility, how one may flip around and become the other. Burke's example of the "noblest synecdoche" is that of "microcosm" and "macrocosm" – one may be said to be a "representation" of the other and vice-versa (p. 508). So there could be the village representing the world. Or a jug representing it all. Or the global could stand for what's happening in a petri dish. The totality of what's happening in one computer program or organizational system could be stood for by "the global." For instance, within a very limited, closed system/context, a leader might say at a planning meeting, We really need to get a global view here – not meaning international or planetary view – but rather an overall, holistic view within the very limited context (even if that context is not seen as limited by those within it).

4. Lastly, the global as irony/dialectic. Irony is many things, but at least one of them is reversal. When we say something is ironic we can mean that some significant turn has taken place that may be the opposite of where things started. Burke ties all of this closely to his version of "dialectic" where there's always "two sides of the coin" (cf. Meltzer, 2005, p. 53). There's always the negative that goes with the positive. Matter and dark matter, if you will. Something and nothing. So the global both is and isn't global in this perspective. It's not just that the global could be local or be a jug or be a petri dish. It's also that it needn't be at all and yet it is and/or we make it so. The fact that the global might not be

so is a basic insight into any further reflection upon what it is or how it may operate.

Here it can only be pointed to how reflection on tropes may cooperate and contribute to reflection on global studies, in part, engaging virtual studies (Botz-Bornstein, 2015, pp. 78ff.), exploring the "invisible continent[s]" (Ohmae 2000) that make the global, among other things "a state of mind" (James, 2021, p. 210), and a sign which stands for something that is "capable of speaking to our most intensely felt individual needs" (Konings, 2015, p. 19; cf. Hochschild 1983/2002; Zuboff, 2019). We, all of us, one way or another (individually, globally, or otherwise), don't just get real: we get trope-ical.

Find the first part of these meditations here.

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CLAUDE-RAPHAËL SAMAMA

GLOBALISATION: IN SEARCH OF UTOPIAS

Samuel Huntington merely popularized an existing model derived from international relations or scenarios of confrontation. He fails to theorize a truly socio-transcendental, spiritual and existential – rather than political – stage upon which the deeper identity of human groups is played out. The cultural groupings he superficially calls "civilizations" are not merely ethnolinguistic groups, systemic ensembles stemming from international relations, or simple intersections of circumstantial interests, such as the theorized "islamo-confucian" alliance or the "serbo-orthodox" bloc. In some ways they are less, not possessing the power to impose themselves as *civilizations*, which is to say as sovereign, unifying, generalized, and transformative entities, as the West is today. But they are also more, from the perspective of their oft overlooked anthropological soundness. The "signs and signifiers" produced by Confucian, Hindu, Judaic, Christian, or Quranic cultural symbolisms cannot be fully explored here. Nonetheless, they are indeed the cause for possible confrontations in the context of globalization, as Huntington believes, but the stakes in question are more than anything socio-transcendental, spiritual, and existential, as it is their worth and mutual respect that is called into question. We will put forward some perspectives, to be taken as counter-models, or axes to explore.

1) The economicist solutions currently proposed in the shadow of globalization are either rather too brief, or do little more than simply endorse the same old development models without calling significant aspects of it into question. Limitless planetary growth, an exclusively financial conception of markets, and unbridled liberalism, are thus confused for a truly human equilibrium.

2) Models of regulation proposed by international organizations (IMF, WTO, World Bank, etc.) claim to help the poorest or to level the playing field, but these are instead beholden to their foundationally inegalitarian structures and draconian neo-liberal orthodoxy and dogma (Galbraith, Stiglitz). Policies of supposed "structural adjustment," simplistically imposing Western market standards – without any regulation – to diverse contexts have almost all failed. The very countries that were supposed to be *en route* and working towards these ideals were brutalized by these rules and by the institutions that applied them without a spec of nuance. The successive crises in Mexico, Thailand, and Indonesia, as well as Argentina, Greece, Lebanon, and many African countries are abundant proof of these failures.

3) It is political solutions that are the most cruelly missing today. The collapse of the communist system, which for decades, despite its flaws, did nonetheless bolster the struggle against imperialism and for decolonization, left a theoretical and ideological gap that has not been refilled. No operational economic theory capable of universalizing its concepts has replaced a heuristic doctrine of which we most often only remember its political character, or the patent failures of its applications throughout history.

4) Countermodels abound, some characterized by protectionist tendencies and a desire to reestablish the nation-state's prerogatives in opposition to bureaucratic or falsely communitarian entities that call for autotomy or greater margins of national maneuver, and others who more sparingly reject only the boundless nature of borderless capitalism and its imperialism (Amin, Chesnais, Wallerstein, Latouche, Maris, Stiglitz, Sen, etc.). They can certainly provide effective temporary alternatives to a globalization that is often perceived to be fatally inevitable.

5) The role of humanitarian models steeped in "*human rights*," often hypocritically formal, seeking to widen development aid, institutional solidarity, or cooperation between nations, is naturally well intentioned. But the multiplication of NGOs, whose goals are no doubt noble and presumably generous, has over the decades failed to truly modify the existing structures. It is possible that all these movements are simply not capable of effectively opposing a West-centered expanse, squashed between its powerful oligarchies and multinational corporations that are often even more powerful than states themselves on the one hand, and the sputtering desires to exist within singular identities or to simply find other manners of existence on the other.

To imagine, build, and think new utopias is the most important task of today. It may only be through models that advocate rupture, through the most imaginative and subversive constructions or "deconstructions," through the invention of shocking but harmonizing forms, that the solutions to a uniform and flattening, multidimensionally destructive, globalizing globalization can be found.

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TAI YOUNG-TAFT

GAME THEORY AND THE LOGIC OF NUCLEAR PLAY

Game theory is a theoretical orientation towards the solution of strategic interaction problems that grew up around World War II. In it a number of players are indicated, their possible plays, and payoffs for each given what all players play.

In order to solve the game for rational action a solution concept is required that specifies conditions under which the game is said to be solved.

Game theory came to be the dominant modeling paradigm of evolutionary biology in which, in general, phenotypic features compete with each other for dominance in an organism's make up, relative to its ecosystemic niche. Here, games are repeated over time, and phenotypic features are replicated in a population relative to their status over the course of repeated play.

In this context it was made apparent that not bluffing is a core principle, as if you do you will be known to be non-credible, and in repeated play an opponent will use that against you.

Another outcome is that 'tit-for-tat' play - that is, see what the other person did and repeat it - is generally evolutionarily dominant. The reason for this may be that cooperating and not harming others incentivizes them to not harm and help you, while not cooperating and harming may induce the opposite, with relevant evolutionarily gains.

In the context of nuclear play, that is, threat and/or deterrence of use of nuclear armament, these principles are important to keep in mind. Additionally, as the stakes get higher the payoffs associated with not bluffing do as well. In particular, using nuclear weapons or their credible threat of use may induce retaliation; in the context of not bluffing, this may lead to pre-emptive use. Additionally, as arming one's self and placing nuclear armaments within sailable range of adversaries constitutes a threat, this may lead to nuclear build up and/or war.

With stakes as high as they are, game theory indicates logic of nuclear play must take into consideration that an opponent will play tit-for-tat, not bluff, and presume players in general are not bluffing. Additionally, rational play indicates disarmament and de-escalation, as for a given level of play, one might induce tit-for-tat strategy towards a non-confrontational level.

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BOOK REVIEW

DENNIS C. RASMUSSEN: *THE INFIDEL AND THE PROFESSOR*

REVIEWED BY RICHARD MCDONOUGH

Dennis C. Rasmussen has produced an excellent account of "the greatest of all philosophical friendships" between two of the great thinkers of the underappreciated "Scottish Enlightenment", Adam Smith, Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow who, in his The Wealth of Nations, is often seen as the founder of capitalism and creator of the modern science of economics, and David Hume, who never became an academic but who took "British Empiricism" to its logical sceptical conclusion and is often seen as the most influential philosopher ever to write in the English language.

The book covers the span between Smith's and Hume's first meeting in 1749 until Smith's eulogy upon Hume's death in 1776. It describes how they commented on each other's work, supported each other's careers and literary ambitions and advised each other on personal issues. They had many of the same friends, joined the same clubs, and were interested in many of the same subjects beyond philosophy, including psychology, history, politics and Britain's conflict with the American colonies.

Each chapter focuses on an historical episode and theme, beginning with an introduction to Hume and his works (Chap. 1), Smith's discovery of Hume's writings and acquaintance with Hume (Chap. 2), their developing friendship (Chap. 3), Hume's conflict with the Church of Scotland (Chap. 4), Smith's work on *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Chap. 5), Hume's fruitful sojourn in France (Chap. 6), Hume's friendship and eventual conflict with the moody paranoid Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chap. 7), the last years of Hume's and Smith's friendship (Chap. 8), Smith's publication of *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Chap. 9), the dispute over Smith's reluctance to publish Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Chap. 10), Hume's final days (Chap. 11), Smith's Eulogy to Hume (Chap. 12), and Smith's final years in Edinburgh (Epilogue).

Rasmussen brings out the contrast between Hume and Smith both in their writings in their public *persona*. Whereas Smith, known as a deist, was the widely respected professor at the *University of Glasgow* for more than a decade, Hume was seen as "the great Infidel" for his sceptical philosophy and irreligious irreverence. Rasmussen shows that the two philosophers were close both personally and intellectually but that they had some serious differences, especially about the place of Christianity in society. However, Rasmussen also reveals, intriguingly, that Smith's private religious views were closer to Hume's public ones than is commonly believed and that Smith contributed more to philosophy than is generally appreciated.

The book also helps to explain why the "Scottish Enlightenment" developed differently, both intellectually and politically, from the "French Enlightenment". Whereas French Enlightenment figures were often disaffected intellectuals at war with establishment elites in society, the Scottish "literati" were often "widely admired and deeply engaged members of their communities" (p. 8), which helps to explain why a deep "conservatism," reflected in both Smith's and Hume's works, characterizes the Scottish Enlightenment.

One might complain that Rasmussen gives more time to Hume than to Smith but this is probably inevitable since very little is known about Smith's personal life and beliefs because he wrote relatively few letters, had almost all of his remaining manuscripts burned by his literary executors, and was generally more guarded in expressing opinions on certain topics than Hume.
One might also complain that Rasmussen spends far more time on the biography of the two thinkers than he does on intellectual ideas. First, however, there are interesting remarks on the intellectual ideas of the two thinkers, especially in chapters devoted to their works. Second, if there is a greater emphasis on the biographies rather than their ideas, this is because Rasmussen's primary aim is to understand the very unique kind of *friendship* between the two towering Enlightenment figures that helped each of them to produce their various intellectual ideas.

Rasmussen's book should be of great interested to anyone interested in the development of modern economic thought, specifically, political economy and classical liberalism. He has done an excellent job unearthing little known stories and correspondence and woven them together with events in Hume's life in an illuminating way. The book is clear and well written. Rasmussen presents evidence and evaluates controversies and questions concerning the relationship between Smith and Hume and with others in a judicious informed way. Since the book is well documented with extensive footnotes it should be of great use to both beginners and experts who wish to develop a greater understanding of Smith or Hume. Finally, it should be of great interest to anyone interested in the philosophical background of many of the globalist ideas in modern commercial society.

Dennis C. Rasmussen: *David Hume, Adam Smith, and the Friendship that Shaped Modern*

Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017: pp. xiv, 316.

Richard McDonough has a B.A. in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Cornell. He has authored several books and numerous articles on philosophy, psychology and linguistics.



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